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✼  Recent global trends have affected significantly territorial and economic 
policies, especially in advanced-economy democracies, weakening frequently their 
national sovereignty. This paper, through published data, documentary sources, and 
interviews, offers a comparative perspective of industrial localisation’s policies in Israel 
and Italy, focusing on the dualism national decision-making/local practice. Although 
they have two different political structures, both countries have shifted to greater 
decentralisation, increased deregulation, and more privatisation. Since the beginning of 
the State, Israel industrial localisation policy used tools as national and regional 
planning and fiscal incentives, with the objective of the industrial dispersal. But last 
years’ profound economic, political, and social changes have led to a transformation of 
Israeli industrial geography, shifting changes in the government policies, and 
reinforcing the local-government assertiveness. Developing industrial parks has become 
a top priority even for rural regional council, with the risk of over-investment in too 
many industrial parks of too small a size. Similarly, since post-war years Italy 
concentrated on regenerating the economic periphery, the southern regions, through the 
“Cassa per il Mezzogiorno”, helping finance and developing irrigation, agriculture and 
industrial development in the most disadvantaged areas with a policy of investments in 
infrastructures and financial supports to the localisation of large firms. The change of 
industrial models, now based on more flexible structures, has brought, almost 
spontaneously, the “Third Italy” phenomenon, a proliferation of ‘local production 
systems’ (LPS) where SMEs represent an high share of total employment. Based on an 
endogenous development model, the success of LPS is not guaranteed unless change 
and innovation take place among local SMEs and institutions and between the local 
production system and the external environment, competing areas and other spatial 
system. For both countries is necessary a comprehensive, strategic and flexible planning 
and a stable, efficient and no-bureaucratic decision-making process, at an intermediate 
scale between regional and local.  
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1.  Introduction 
Recent global trends have affected significantly territorial and economic policies, 
especially in advanced-economy democracies. Reducing the barriers constituted by the 
distance and allowing the co-ordination of production and commerce on a global scale, 
the technological evolution of information, communication and transportation, has made 
easier the trans-nationalisation of production and distribution, giving to international 
economic institutions the powers once reserved to nation-states (Brecher and Costello, 
1995). In addition, the erosion of the economic sovereignty of the state-nation (Ohmae, 
1995), particularly with respect to those policies that affect international trade, 
investment, and financial flows, has contributed to a growing interdependence between 
economic globalisation and local development. 
“…Too small to handle global forces, yet too big to manage people’s lives”
1, the nation-
states have understood to be no more the protagonists of the global economy and, on the 
contrary, they have to carry out the necessary changes in their systems to attract capitals 
and activities (Ohmae, 1995). These trends involve a rethinking of national 
governments role and their economic development policies. 
Since ‘50s, in a context of heavy industrialisation, many developed countries started 
policies of industrial localisation trying to address capitals and new industrial plants in 
backward regions. Balancing flows of public funds and/or subsidies to large private 
firms for establishing in those regions could have promoted economic growth and 
employment and improving the ‘regional balance’ (Richardson, 1969).  
During the ‘60s, the crisis of the large industrial systems began to point out an almost 
spontaneous growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). And this can not be only 
explained with the productive decentralisation of large firms in search of more 
favourable conditions of labour cost and use (Garofoli, 1992; Bagnasco, 1999). It 
depended rather on a trend, alternative to the vertical concentration in large units, and 
that is a generalized return to the horizontally coordinated production between firms, 
organized in small endogenous industrial settlements, the ‘industrial districts’ 
(Bagnasco, 1999). 
Starting from a reflection about transformations of industrial localisation clustering, i.e. 
the nature of localised growth in spatial economy, the paper aims to analyse national 
and local governments’ policies for promoting industrial settlements, particularly for 
developing endogenous innovative entrepreneurial initiatives, through the comparative   5
perspective of two case studies, Israel and Italy. The impetus for this rethinking had 
come originally from a wider comparative study
2, drawn mainly from published data, 
documentary sources, and interviews, which has employed the method of comparative 
analysis to better understand Israeli planning by placing a number of aspects of Israeli 
society, economy and politics in a comparable perspective. Refusing the perception of 
Israel’s “uniqueness”, the study tried to evidence how the current rate of change in 
many countries, including Israel, in the direction of economic liberalisation and political 
democratisation, has raised new and important issues, i.e. changes in industrial 
localisation, that have made Israel society, economy, and politics more “normal part of 
history” and less an “a-historical” phenomenon. At the same time, this has made easier 
to compare Israel’s processes to those that have taken place in other socio-economic and 
political systems, i.e. Italy, pointing out on administrative decentralisation and planning 
strategies. 
 
2.  Models and definitions in the industrial localisation theory  
We could expect some public powers’ formulas for sustaining industrial development 
and particularly for giving birth to it where it is still absent, copying processes already 
verified elsewhere. In the latest years, the attention has been focused on ‘industrial 
districts’, that is specialised areas of small producers, where undefined conditions make 
horizontal integration of the production more profitable. Nevertheless, if a general 
theory of economic development based on small enterprises has begun to take root 
(Bagnasco, 1999), on the other hand it has been found that phenomena are various and 
changeable. These areas are activated by local production systems (LPS) with 
characteristic features and, for understanding them, it is necessary to investigate their 
particular practices of economic integration in the society. Undoubtedly, the 
comparative analysis is the only reasonable way for considering what resources can be 
mobilised and what difficulties must be overcome to obtain positive results. 
Focusing on the processes rather than structures, it necessary to define a framework in 
which industrial localisation policies are seen as relating to a number of distinct types of 
industrial clustering in the spatial economy. As Gordon and McCann (2000) suggest, we 
can individuate three basic forms of clustering. “Two of these are developed from the 
neo-classical tradition of economics: the classic model of pure agglomeration, and the 
industrial–complex model. The third model, which is that of the network, was   6
developed initially outside mainstream economics and owes rather more to sociological 
perspectives”
3. 
In the model of pure agglomeration (Marshall, 1925), the firms group together for 
achieving advantages of internal returns of scale, localisation economies, urbanisation 
economies. In this model, relations between firms and between firms and mobile factors 
are neither identifiable nor static. The system is without any particular observable 
organisation or inter-agent loyalty, and simply functions as an ecology of activities 
benefiting from proximity, and developing emergent forms of specialisation. The 
absence of formal structures or strong long-term relations between businesses in this 
model means that the local system has essentially an ‘open membership’, for any 
business establishment located in the area. This model evidently underlies modern urban 
economic theory, and its elements are recognisable features of the economies of 
metropolitan areas, widely supposed to be of enhanced importance to businesses 
seeking to maintain flexibility in an era of increased uncertainty and change (Gordon 
and McCann, 2000). On the contrary, the model of industrial complex is characterised 
by sets of identifiable and stable relations among firms that are partially manifested in 
their spatial behaviour. These relations are conceived primarily in terms of trading links. 
In this model, the individual firms, aspiring to minimise their observable spatial 
transactions costs, have implicitly or explicitly determined that is best achieved by 
locating close to other firms within the particular input-output production and 
consumption hierarchy of which they are part. The system in principle is not reducible 
to the smallest units possible, and no sunset of actors can recreate the system, because 
they do not have all of the necessary information about technology, labour 
specialisation, product innovation and markets. The complex is a ‘closed club’ and in 
the same way that the individual organisation monopolises the ability to innovate in 
certain products or processes, the organisation of the complex monopolises the ability of 
the firm to realise the benefits of those innovations (Gordon and McCann, 2000). Born 
as a critique of the neo-classical approach to the existence and development of 
institutions, the social-network model perceived the creation of hierarchical 
organisations and institutions as a rational response to the transactions-costs problems 
caused by bounded rationality and opportunism in a pure market-contracting economy. 
The development of organisations that allow transactions to be internalised and co-
ordinated means that trust becomes institutionalised within the economic system. These 
interpersonal relationships depend on interpersonal trust and the informality of these   7
relationships is viewed as being a potential strength rather than a weakness. There are 
three key features of this trust-based behaviour: 1. firms within social network are 
willing to undertake risky co-operative and joint ventures without fear of opportunism; 
2. firms are willing to reorganise their relationships without fear of reprisals; 3. firms 
are willing to act as a group in support of common mutually beneficial goals. The social 
network is comprised of a set of transitive private relationships in conditions where 
neither price signals nor monitoring are sufficient to ensure the implementation of a 
particular project or activity. Social networks became a form of durable social capital 
(Coleman, 1990), created through a combination of social history and ongoing 
collective action. In this sense, their strength is inherently problematic, depending upon 
a prior accumulation of trust, circumstances which facilitate monitoring of others’ 
behaviour, a source of leadership and/or a sense of common interest, as well as the 
expectation of significant gains. Access to the club will depend on past experience and 
routine interaction as well as on investments of efforts in developing personal relations 
and trust. Much of the recent interest in social capital as a productive asset, particularly 
within the field of spatial planning, arises from the fact that the social-network model 
has been viewed as largely applicable to particular observations of spatial industrial 
clustering, i.e. SMEs’ industrial districts (Gordon and McCann, 2000). The large 
acknowledgement of a new local ability of wealth production and employment in the 
modern economy, has arisen new territorial theories in the planning field (Magnagni, 
1998). They focused on the concept of self-sustainability, which put in the foreground 
the ‘local’ aspect as an essential issue in economic development, and the “territorial 
production” develops into an internal problem for long-term production of wealth (Pace, 
2000). 
These new theories are alternative to conventional approach to spatial policy, 
inadequate in the face of macroeconomic and structural developments of 1980/90s, 
aiming to find innovative strategies for stimulating endogenous growth in redundant or 
marginal areas. The territorial planning has been too much joined to land use problems 
and characterised by an extreme slowness in the processes of plan elaboration, approval 
and implementation. Therefore it hasn’t been able to support processes of local 
development, becoming an useless tool, sometimes harmful. The same political context 
has not always encouraged the analytical visibility which is required both for empirical 
testing of these propositions, and for assessing the broad scale of benefits which the 
various kinds of policy initiative might be expected to yield in different contexts. In   8
particular, there has been a tendency to use terms such as ‘local systems’, ‘industrial 
districts’, ‘innovative milieu’, more or less interchangeably, with little interest for 
question of operationalisation and for the different theoretical contexts out of which 
these ideas have emerged. We started to investigate, through our case studies, the degree 
of public policies’ awareness about the economic and social conditions, which explain 
born, growth and changes of local economies where small enterprises are of importance, 
relatively independents and, as a whole, moderately able of strategy, or if/how the 
‘industrial districts’ development is dependent by national policies, and how a growing 
awareness of the changes in the spatial organisation of modern manufacturing and 
distribution activities and the communication possibilities, provided by the advent of 
new information technologies, can open the way to a renewed public-policy role in local 
economic development issues. This investigation could contribute to answer to the 
dilemma if a planning approach could better satisfy needs of local development than 
following spontaneous trends or spatially generic policies. 
Generally, paraphrasing Becattini (1989), the keystone seems the possibility to 
individuate intermediate planning organisations between the whole system and the 
single subject, that can give pertinence to the concept of partial system as a system that 
neither comprises all the relations among economic organisations nor confines itself to 
the economic subject representation.  
 
3.  Early phases of industrial development policies (1948-1973) 
A significant feature of both countries is the broad power in industrial development held 
by their public bodies, for different reasons and with different means. Since the 
establishment of the Israeli State, the political needs to strengthen the borders, to assure 
a permanent occupation of all the region, and to absorb an always growing number of 
Jews that could come back to the “Fatherland” (Pace, 1993), brought the government to 
promote a ‘population dispersal’, for a long time stated as one of the cornerstone of the 
national planning. A major element of this policy was the establishment of more than 
thirty new towns all around the country. Government authorities considered to disperse 
industry as a means for providing employment in peripheral regions, contrasting yet 
with the local industrial structure, mostly concentrated in Tel Aviv and Haifa. Justified 
by the continuous state of war against Arab countries, this policy influenced strongly the 
industrial choices in terms of activities and geographical distribution (Gradus, Razin, 
and Krakover, 1993). This emphasised a persistent dilemma between defence and   9
security needs on the one hand, calling for dispersal (also industrial), and on the other, 
economic efficiency, requiring agglomeration and concentration of economic activities 
in urban areas. However, the need to develop sophisticated defence products promoted 
primarily high-technology industries (Gradus, Razin, and Krakover, 1993), and 
contributed to forge both a culture of productive innovation and suitable human 
resources, making the country competitive in export market.  
On the contrary, in Italy the dramatic post world war urgency - mass unemployment, 
inflation, generalised poverty - caused an industrial rebuild in a framework of continuity 
with the pre-war period (Bruno, 1995), focusing financial aids on a limited number of 
large firms, territorially concentrated in the north of the country. These firms, thanks to 
a situation of almost monopoly, succeeded to affirm themselves in the international 
market too, nevertheless sustaining remarkable technical-dimensional unbalances, 
peculiar features of the Italian productive structure. In this way, it grew the gap between 
a limited number of large firms, strongly integrated and newly equipped, and a vast 
number of small productive units unable to overcome a mean local market. But some 
more it grew the gap between the North and the South of the country. Notwithstanding 
the government established an agency, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, to help finance 
and develop irrigation, agriculture and industrial development in the southern regions, 
the existence of disadvantaged areas guaranteed both intense migratory flows, which 
allowed to control the labour market in the advanced areas on the demand side, and an 
always wider market in the relatively depressed regions for the advanced regions’ 
products, through public expenditure increase caused by the special intervention and the 
transfer policy (Garofoli, 1976). Such industrial agglomeration process also pointed out 
other characters of the Italian industrial structure, as a weak industrial culture, a lack of 
industrial employment and of domestic market, and a fragmentary infrastructure system. 
In both countries, the public industrial policy was carried out through financial 
investments and the action of large productive public mechanisms. But, while Italian 
industrial support was unplanned and fragmentary, and principally condensed on a 
direct participation in industrial productions and regulating credit facilities to support 
SMEs and industrial reconvention programmes, the Israeli government employed 
physical planning and economic incentives for supporting industrial development.  
In Israel the almost total governmental control of the main resources, both physical and 
human, made possible a continuous implementation of national plans to direct large 
numbers of immigrants to specific locations. The promise of welcoming every Jew that   10
wants come back to Israel, sanctioned by the Law of the Return (1950), influenced 
greatly Israeli planning doctrine, giving to the collective commitment a supremacy and 
priority over individual self-fulfilment (Shachar, 1996). At that time, two basic planning 
principles, as economic efficiency and social equity, were not significant, and virtually 
only the spatial organisation of localities was an aim of national planning. According to 
Christaller’s central localities theory, the first National Plan’s goal was to direct the 
ever-growing stream of immigration into new planning regions, organised in a 
hierarchic rural-urban network. The weak settlement structure of the time was 
strengthen by the establishment of new towns, most of them planned as expansions of 
already existing small town-lets. The National plan sited extractive industries near the 
mineral resources in the Southern towns, heavy and assembly industries near the port 
towns, and light industries spread among the medium-sized regional new towns 
(Sharon, 1976). For attracting industries in peripheral regions, the government both 
planned infrastructures and services for new industrial areas, and fixed economic 
incentives. The major incentives for industrial localisation were incorporated in the Law 
for Encouraging Capital Investment (1950) and the benefits included tax concessions, 
reduced obstacles to importing inputs, and permission to transfer profits abroad. The 
Law defined criteria for granting an ‘approved enterprise’ status to investment plans in 
manufacturing and tourism, according to the location of the investment and to its 
contribution to exports (Gradus, Razin, and Krakover, 1993). “Population dispersal has 
been stated as one of the goals of the Law since 1950, but only in 1959 were explicit 
measures, differentiating between central areas and development zones incorporated in 
the law”
4, with the classification of national priority zone A and B. It attracted to 
peripheral regions capital-intensive plants and non-exporting plants, also because the 
exporting ones could obtain most of the incentives in central regions as well (Schwartz, 
1985). Nearly all the new plants were either owned by firms and residents of the central 
regions, or to a small extend by foreign investors. Investments in development towns 
favoured large plants (Kipnis, 1977) in such non-growing manufacturing branches as 
textiles, characterised by unskilled labour, failing to attract fast growing high-
technology industries, usually export-oriented. Moreover, specific industries, not 
particularly beneficial to the Israeli economy, were included in a blacklist of industries 
that were ineligible for incentives, unless they wished to locate plants in the most 
depressed development towns. Additional benefits granted to plants locate in the 
periphery included subsidised land and infrastructure developed by the government-  11
owned Industrial Building Corporation. Plants located in development zones also 
occasionally received preference in obtaining government contracts. But exports and 
R&D subsidies - the two major industrial subsidies other than those incorporate in the 
Law for Encouraging Capital Investment – have contributed to reduce the Law 
commitments (Gradus, Razin, and Krakover, 1993). 
In Italy, the weakness of planning culture restrained the government activity in the 
industrial development, as shown by Vanoni Scheme
5  where a effectual planning 
validity was impoverished by the operative apparatus inadequacy and the scarce 
planning government capacity. In the industrial field, more concrete was the institution 
of the Ministero delle Partecipazioni Statali (1956), with functions of co-ordination and 
control of public enterprises, which enlarged the public power domain both in the 
participated enterprises and dictated the principle of  necessity of a government co-
ordination for each economic sector. Moreover, the policy of firms owned by the 
government assumed the shape of an autonomous model of behaviour, instrumental to 
the State goals, i.e. for promoting economic development. Also pursuing a policy 
principally concerned with strategic issues rather than physical planning, the 
government reinforced the principle of supporting Mezzogiorno industrialisation 
through the Law 634 of the 1957, which prepared condition for the establishment of 
industrial development areas and units, inside whom to concentrate activities of 
financial support, of infrastructure implementation, and to amplify credit incentives to 
industrial investments in the southern regions, attributing to the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno the faculty to provide grants to credit institutions for industrial subsidy 
operations. The Law fixed, moreover, the obligation for the public firms to reserve to 
the southern regions 60 per cent of new productive investments at least, and in any case 
no less of 40 per cent of their annual investments total, introducing an heavy 
conditioning factor of public firms, particularly for their prevailing northern location 
(Bruno, 1995). In this way, the public firms became the privileged instrument for the 
industrial policy in the Mezzogiorno, and the same definition of policy directions and 
goals was divided among a plurality of decision-makers and implemented through 
negotiations that, apart from a growing un-responsibility of political parties and firm 
managements, translated in the impossibility to have an effective planning. On the 
contrary, in Israel the existence of firms owned by the government and by Histadrut, not 
always based on purely economic considerations, gave the opportunity to develop major 
industrial projects in peripheral regions, as a wide-scale development of mineral   12
extracting plants in the south, whereas the role of the private sector in industrial 
dispersal was minimum until the late ‘50s.    
Notwithstanding Israel experienced rapid economic growth and industrial expansion 
between the late 1950s and the early 1970s (Plessner, 1994), the extensive government 
incentives
6 produced certain distortions in the pattern of investment which became more 
and more evident as the system was continued over decades. Distortions as the 
establishment of capital-intensive plants in peripheral areas with high unemployment, or 
location of production for domestic market with poor prospect of profitability. The 
incentives also had a weak influence on the location of R&D-intensive facilities because 
the generally non-spatial R&D subsidies have usually been far more significant for such 
functions than the capital subsidies. As Schwartz noticed, tax concessions also caused 
another distortion. The incentive has been higher for short-term initiatives, such as low 
risk tradition production lines, rather than long-range investments. So we can resume 
that incentives attracted to development areas those enterprises and initiatives with a 
weak financial base which were most dependent on public financing. The Schwartz 
analysis for the period 1977-1984 demonstrates the tendency of the law to attract 
traditional non-growth industries to development towns (Schwartz, 1989), without 
generating local entrepreneurships, and least of all innovative milieux. On the contrary, 
in Italy, beside large public and private firms, it was reinforcing the presence of SMEs 
spread on the territory that started to assume a more active role in the Italian 
development process (Bruno, 1995). In fact, to the great productive growth determined 
by the 1953-63 investments phase it succeeded a reduced expansive capacity of the 
large firms, caused by clear factors of weakness, as a scarce technological innovation 
and an ineffective financial organisation. The first was produced by: 1. slightly of public 
and private efforts in applied research; 2. financial difficulties for supporting the 
development of more innovative sectors; 3. absence of a governmental industrial policy 
directed to achieve qualified productive goals. The second factor was principally due to 
familiar structure of the firms, also the largest, in contrast with the necessity of 
enlarging the share capital for withstanding the international competition. The industrial 
weakness modified the government firms system through rescue interventions of private 
firms in crisis. With the aim of maintaining and supporting employment, these rescue 
produced distortions in the productive system, as a slower decision-making process, 
with a decisive role held by political needs, a minor importance of business results, and 
a larger use of credit facilities.       13
 
4.  Economic stagnation and the emergence of local development strategies 
The changing economic reality of the 1970s and 1980s reduced growth rates in the both 
countries economy since 1973, and shifts in global economic conditions associated with 
the restructuring of industrial activities. In Israel, this affected the performance of the 
national spatial industrialisation policy, without a governmental revision of the public 
incentive policies. Particularly, the stagnation of Israel’s economy involved a lack of 
significant industrial growth, with the result that development areas have been 
competing in an increasingly zero-sum game against central regions over industrial 
investment. Hence, spatial industrialization policy survived mainly as a tool for 
alleviating short-term unemployment problems, not for development towns long-term 
growth (Gradus, Razin, and Krakover, 1993).  
The governmental policies continued to have the same goals, producing only 
quantitative modification in terms of national planning and incentives. As pointed out 
by Gradus, Razin and Krakover, it was clear the inability of the government to revise 
the map of development zones; to reorient measures towards new types of enterprises; 
to decentralise agencies engaged in development efforts; and to re-evaluate general 
priorities in public efforts to promote the periphery (Gradus, Razin, and Krakover, 
1993). Changes in the map of development zone (1967, 1972, 1977) were made without 
considering their wider implications for other towns and regions, and showing a basic 
difference between policy measures resulting from a comprehensive planning approach, 
and those produced through political pressure leading to incremental modifications. But 
the successive government efforts at implementation of the map have been blocked by 
local political interests. The presence of influential leaders in development towns near 
metropolitan areas created ‘niches of subsidence’, that is towns located in central areas 
with the same incentives of peripheral regions, emphasising the socio-economic gap 
between centre and periphery.  
Another cause of declining effectiveness of government’s incentives for industrial 
dispersal was represented by the growth of high-technology industries, which urged for 
a model of pure agglomeration. In fact, complex and unstable input, output, and 
informational networks imply high transaction costs and a tendency to agglomerate near 
suppliers, subcontractors, customers, and information sources. Since the late 1960s, 
fast-growing high-tech industries have been perceived as Israel’s greatest hope for 
economic advancement. The large domestic demand for sophisticated defence products,   14
combined with abundant human capital and a high-tech R&D complex, has given to 
Israeli high-tech industries a place in the international division of labour. The role of 
government in developing this sector has increased since 1976, largely through grants to 
civilian R&D projects with export potential (Gradus, Razin, and Krakover, 1993), in 
addition to the incentives of the Law for Encouraging Capital Investment. Nevertheless, 
government support for high-tech investment has tended to find his way to the largest 
firms and holding companies, and small enterprises have been recipient of only about 
10% of all Israeli government aid. In this sector, government incentives had a role of 
attracting multinational firms, offsetting the political risks of investing in Israel and in 
gaining the competitive edge over other countries. In particular, it attracted R&D and 
skill-intensive production units of multinationals in the electronic industry 
headquartered in the United States, and this penetration stood in contrast to the small 
share of foreign companies in the Israeli economy, representing a break with earlier 
trends. So, there was a decline of traditional industries, which used to be dominant in 
peripheral regions, and a contemporary growth of industries and production process that 
tend to avoid the periphery, i.e. micro-electronics, producer services, and R&D 
functions.    
In Italy, the slowing down of growth rates promoted a transformation in the relations 
between large and small enterprises, particularly for the incidence of territorial, 
organizational and productive differentiation and concentration factors. It began to 
growth the ‘peripheral’ economy of SMEs, about whom exists already a copious 
bibliography. To the classical dualistic paradigm - North industrialised and undeveloped 
Mezzogiorno – there was the addition of a ‘Third Italy’, located in the centre-west of the 
country and not attributable to the two traditional divisions (Bruno, 1995). Without 
studying further in deep the argument, we must notice that the specific development 
features - as the prevalence of small company size, the role of the family as fundamental 
economic and entrepreneurial unit, the integration among specialised agriculture, craft 
and new industrial initiatives, the aggregative strength of small enterprises systems, the 
structuration of industrial districts locally identifiable as unitary productive settlements 
(LPS) spread on the territory, were allowed by original cultural and social 
characteristics, which guaranteed a large distribution of advantages and the model 
acceptance (Bagnasco, 1999). The characteristic social milieu provides technical and 
trade knowledge spread among many subjects, a custom shared with the idea and the 
market practices, personal relationship networks characterized by mutual trust for a   15
simple information exchange and for negotiating deals easily together with low 
transaction costs. The governmental policy was very limited, indirectly facilitating the 
so called ‘familiar enterprises’ with fiscal measures. Therefore, the reasons of this 
productive agglomeration can be individuated in environmental features as: 1. the 
availability of capitals coming from a rich agriculture; 2. the presence of measure to 
cushion the effects of unemployment in the family and the community; 3. the long 
incubation of both entrepreneurial abilities and technological knowledge, exploded with 
the appearance of market and productive favourable conditions; 4. the close contact of 
these regions with developed areas and productive structures, which work as immediate 
outlet market and supplier of intermediate products and capitals. These processes, in 
local contexts as those of the Mezzogiorno – characterized by different economic and 
productive conditions – don’t succeeded to catch on, breaking up this trend in a plurality 
of single local cases, promoted something by those bigger industrial settlements born 
with the special intervention. The crisis of the Fordism and the following de-
industrialization process acquired different territorial means. In the Centre-North, to the 
resizing of work force and productive units in the large and medium enterprises it has 
been opposed a relevant growth of the characteristic technical size and a consolidation 
of the small enterprises already influential presence, typical of the district model 
(Giannola, 1998), showing implications of a physiologic passage to tertiary, similarly to 
other advanced economies; in the Mezzogiorno they were a feedback of a structural 
crisis that exceeded the economic structure, increased by the unexpected liquidation of 
the  Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (1985) and the following conclusion of the special 
intervention (1993). Manufacturing industry had not been developed on the scale 
required and tended to be, similarly to Israeli periphery, capital-intensive rather labour-
intensive, with an emphasis on public utilities, rather on a modern private sector. The 
Cassa powers were transferred by new legislation of regional governments (1986), and 
there was an attempt to promote small-scale industry and tourism, with the aid of 
European Union (EU) funding. In fact, with the 1988 EU reforms the Italian industrial 
policy had to change greatly. With the aim of rationalising fund intervention, the 
reforms identified three regional development ‘objectives’ (in favour of lagging regions, 
areas with industrial decline and rural areas) to be tackled at the Community level by 
the structural funds, including the ERDF (European Regional Development Fund), and 
other financial instruments. In addition, the reforms introduced the aim of concentrating   16
funding on a limited number of priorities within a region’s ‘Community support 
framework’ (Balchin, Sýkora, and Bull, 1999).  
 
Fig. 2. Designated Structural Fund areas in Italy, 1994-1999. 
 
The Mezzogiorno was qualified for the whole of the country’s Objective 1 – economic 
adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind – and through the regional 
ties of government, a sum of 14,9 billion ECU was available for the period 1994-1999 
to promote development with eight priorities, first of all the development of industry, 
small and medium enterprises, craft businesses, business services and industrial estate 
development. This represented a clear change in the funding philosophy, which have put   17
to the test government and local administrations, and the weak planning culture of the 
Southern entrepreneurial system, which had also to face a heavy collective pathology 
caused by phenomena as a spread criminality, nepotism, and corporatism that contrast a 
correct functioning of both public administration and local economy (Meldolesi, 1998).  
 
5.  Emergence of local development strategies and entrepreneurship promotion 
While in Italy, as referred before, the SMEs’ entrepreneurial milieu appeared rather 
significant and stable, at least for the Centre-North, in Israel the dispersal policies, 
besides to fail in elevating economic and social level of development towns, hadn’t 
considered to support measures of entrepreneurial promotion. Nevertheless, in the fringe 
of metropolitan areas, there was a entrepreneurial growth, taking advantage from a pure 
agglomeration clustering. This spontaneous export-oriented trend found as strong allied 
two events: the municipal electoral reform (1978) and the mass immigration from the 
former USSR (1989-1992). The first, which led to the direct election of majors in 1978, 
favoured the increasing role of local authorities in public efforts to promote 
industrialization, together the budgetary policy of the’80s, which improved the reliance 
of local authorities on municipal taxes. It has had a marked shift of Israel industrial 
geography, contributing to a shift in the balance of power between local and central 
government (Elazar and Kalchheim, 1988). The large immigration wave produced a 
new atmosphere in Israel. For the first time, the government didn’t try to control 
immigrants’ decision as to where to reside, and the ‘population dispersal’ ceased to be a 
cornerstone of planning system. In the “National Outline Scheme for construction and 
development and absorption of immigration” (N.O.S. 31) – the major effort to revise 
Israel’s national statutory physical plans – the goal of short-term massive population 
dispersal was abandoned in favour of short-term concentration and only long-term 
dispersal (Golani, Eldor, and Garon, 1992). In the plan was prominent a free-market 
approach to regional development, which advocated to allow “growth in the business 
sector, in advanced manufacturing, in producer services, and in trade to concentrate in 
the central metropolitan areas, from where they would eventually trickle down to 
periphery”
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Fig. 1 -  Incentive for development zones (1998) 
So, after two decades of inertia and small incremental changes in government industrial 
policy, incentives for encouragement of industrial investment were revised in a manner 
unprecedented since the ‘60s, reducing the effective incentive for plants to locate in   19
peripheral regions. Firstly, the pressing needs for immigrant absorption led to the 
introduction of an alternative option: government-guaranteed loans to finance industrial 
investment. Although more favourable in development zones than in the core, in 
general, as with the tax-exemption option, this channel became most attractive in core 
regions. Secondly, an additional factor reducing the incentive for dispersal was given by 
changes in the map of development zones, which gradually expanded towards the Tel 
Aviv and Haifa metropolitan areas. The government’s policy had clear impact on 
location decision and, as shown by Razin (1996), two types of locations attracted the 
largest number of approved programs: the first includes the major urban centers, as well 
other cities in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, with an high proportion in high-tech 
firms; the second combines priority-zone incentives with proximity to metropolitan 
centres. The economic growth and an increase in the industrial investments in the ‘90s 
generated two additional trends, especially in the fringe of Tel Aviv metropolitan area. 
The first trend involves the intensifying competition between municipalities for tax-
generating industrial land uses. Developing industrial parks has become a top priority 
even for rural regional council, with the risk of over-investment in too many industrial 
parks of too small a size. The second trend consists of the penetration of industry into 
rural communities, as moshavim, viewed as an unavoidable consequences of the crisis in 
agriculture. These trends have contributed to a sub-urban diffusion of enterprises, but 
the calls for promoting local entrepreneurship were ignored for a long time by policy-
makers, particularly because they considered absent in the development towns those 
traditions of enterprise, which facilitate in Italy the formation of entrepreneurial 
economies. After early attempts of promoting entrepreneurship - as industrial villages 
initiative, the Ganei Taassiya incubator facility, and loan funds for small business 
initiated in two development towns by  the Jewish Agency’s Project Renewal (Gradus, 
Razin, and Krakover, 1993) – the formation of instruments for promoting 
entrepreneurship by the government, local authorities, and other public organisations 
reached the ‘take-off’ stage only with the new wave of immigrants from the former 
USSR. Together extra-governmental public organisations, and institute of higher 
learning, the central government became directly involved in promoting 
entrepreneurship in the new immigrants through two major instruments: 1. ‘National 
Small Business Loan Fund’ for establishments of up to forty employees and a scheme 
for small business loan guarantees; 2. a financial assistance for the technological 
incubator projects. The assistance could be of two types: 1. a business advisory service,   20
providing information and support services, i.e. small business development centres 
(SBDCs); 2. site-based initiatives, focusing incentives and services on specific 
development sites and their networks of operation. Whereas the first represents a 
philanthropic system to help potential entrepreneurs in all the stages of preparation and 
start up of new productive initiatives, on the model of the ‘American Joint Distribution 
Committee’, the second, constituted by technological incubator, although organised as 
autonomous non-profit corporation under the guidance of the Office of the Chief 
Scientist of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, provides entrepreneurs with physical 
premises, financial resources, tools, professional guidance, and administrative 
assistance, helping them to implement their ideas by turning into exportable commercial 
products and forming productive business ventures in Israel. The incubator is managed 
by a professional salaried director, a policymaking management, and a project 
committee that selects and monitors projects. The last two institutions are composed of 
professionals, corporate and industrial executive, R&D managers in high-tech 
enterprises, professors, and public figures, and all of them work on a voluntary basis. To 
be accepted, the projects must be an R&D projects, based on an innovative 
technological idea that aims to develop a product with export marketing potential. The 
entrepreneurs must be teams of 3-6 people, fledgling and almost 50 per cent former 
USSR immigrants. The stay of the project in the incubator is approximately two years, 
after that the entrepreneurs ‘graduated’ should be able to continue on their own if 
necessary, availing themselves of regular channels of State support and outside 
investments. Immediately upon entering the incubator, the project is registered as a 
limited-liability company and learns to operate as commercial venture. An agreement is 
signed between the project developers and the incubator management to stipulate the 
developers’ rights and to ensure management’s ability to attain its goals and meet its 
commitments to the State, which will reimbursed up to the sum of its grant through 
royalties on sales.  In the 26 actual incubators, 27 per cent of the projects are in 
electronic and 20 per cent in software production, 17 per cent in medical 
instrumentation and 27 per cent in chemistry. However the incubator can not be 
consider a job-creation enterprise, because it stresses entrepreneurship only, now it is 
considered as the most efficient and productive job-creator, open to any entrepreneur or 
inventor of any age. Empirical evidence shows that most people employed during the 
incubator period continue to work in the emergent companies afterward. Where projects 
have failed, the people involved in them have had no problems finding work in their   21
fields. The general results of Israeli incubators experience show 208 projects actually in 
the incubators, while 592 projects had left. Of these “graduates”, 308 have continued 
under their own steam, employing 1.400 professionals. The technological incubator 
success cannot explain without considering the Israeli favourable climate for the high 
technology: the highest rate of engineers and researchers in the world (135 per 10.000 
inhabitants), the highest investment in education (8,9 per cent of GDP) and in civilian 
R&D (2,2 per cent of GDP)
8, the presence in Israel of about 2,000 high-tech companies 
and more than 3,000 high-tech start-ups, an established existence of multi-national 
companies, and a growth of total foreign investment from $537 million (1992) to $5 
billion (1998). The incubator project overcame the government forecasting, greatly 
pushed forward by its global market success, and very remarkable appears the 
involvement of local administrations, universities, research institutes, large 
multinational firms, and non-governmental public organisations. So, local features, in 
terms both of human and social capital, and of infrastructure and institutions, become 
influential factors of productive choices, which overcome sometimes the national level 
for linking directly to global networks. In this sense, an incubator transformation seems 
inevitable in a changing context. Loosing their initial function of integrating 
entrepreneurs and inventor from the former USSR in a market economy, they could 
change goals and structures, stressing especially the financial characteristics and 
becoming attraction poles for foreign capitals. 
Differently by Israel, where local industrial policies and entrepreneurial promotion have 
come out of planners and policy-makers and directed to new immigrants, in Italy the 
government found an already structured SMEs’ system in the Centre-North, based on 
social-network clustering. Moreover, the ‘90s experienced an heavy economic crisis, 
followed by an structural adjustment and a public work freezing, that contributed to 
enlarge the delay in the Mezzogiorno infrastructures. Besides the end of the ‘special 
intervention’ – which contributed to put out of the market a lot of enterprises – the 
public demand failed in guaranteeing satisfying levels of activity for local enterprises 
(Giannola, 1998). The accumulation of these events has determined a significant growth 
of North-South gap, which show itself through a relative decline of incomes and a mass 
unemployment in the South. However, in the South in the face of the disappearance of 
non-local large firms – caused by progressive dismantling of ‘public participations’ 
system and by a growing release of private enterprises – there has been a growth of 
local industrial units of small size, especially in traditional sectors (Giannola, 98). In   22
this situation, many expert have considered more correct an industrial policy for 
selecting and sustaining the existing firms before stimulating new enterprises. 
Moreover, rarely in the Mezzogiorno there are enterprises systems, as Centre-North 
industrial districts, and the small firm size depend on both the limited possibilities of the 
enterprise to start and to sustain autonomously growth processes, and constraints 
deriving by an unfavourable environmental and infrastructure context that presses its 
development. 
The government policy, besides policies for alleviating unemployment and sustaining 
existing firms – through a strategy of flexible wages and a de-regulation of labour 
market – has started policies of both industrial location and entrepreneurship promotion. 
Considering the EU reforms, the government gave to Southern Regions the 
responsibility to individuate local industrial districts, eligible for EU funding as 
development areas. The Regions, through tools as programmi integrati d’area, invited 
local administrations, together social and economic organisations, to elaborate and to 
outline development policies, activating tools as contratti d’area, and eventually using 
resources as patti territoriali. The programmi integrati d’area are based on a technical-
financial programme, provided of a project with short/medium term coordinated 
measures between public and private subjects, directed to maintain or implement 
employment levels, to infrastructure development areas for new productive settlements, 
to facilitate productive activities and services. In many regional directives, it is 
prioritary to recover, to reclaim and to re-use dismantled industrial areas, to delocalise 
polluting plants from urban centres and to designate new areas for productive 
settlements of small non-polluting enterprise. The Contratti d’area and patti territoriali 
are tools that aim to realise a coordinated action of groups of local subjects: the patti 
emphasise the achievement of integrated industrial and infrastructure investments; the 
contratti emphasise the agreement for particular conditions in labour and credit 
measures, and in the security guarantees for areas interested by heavy unemployment. 
Whereas many difficulties have slowed down these tool’s implementation and no final 
judgment is possible, it is possible to affirm that none of them is submitted to a planning 
framework.  
About entrepreneurship promotion, in Italy have been experimented many different 
types of intervention. On a side, we can consider the BIC experience, whose concept 
was launched by the Directorate-General for Regional Policy of the Commission of the 
EC (DG XVI) in 1984, and it is similar to the Israeli SBDCs. Initially intended as an   23
instrument to assist areas undergoing industrial restructuring and economically less-
developed areas of the EEC, it is a small, skilled team working to help SMEs, which 
succeed and thereby contribute to local economic development, as a local or regional 
partnership structure which provides SMEs with a full range of services, on favourable 
terms, focusing on innovation for industry or services to industry. It identifies, selects 
and supports budding entrepreneurs and their project, or existing SMEs. It allocates 
public and private resources to initiatives which contribute to wealth and job creation 
and to activity diversification, also promoting SMEs access to the international market 
and to co-operation. In Italy, some BIC experience were valuable, but only after many 
time their concept has taken root in the Southern regions, i.e. Calabria. On the other 
side, there is a plurality of law for entrepreneurship promotion, as Law 95 of 1995 for 
promotion of youthful enterprises, Law 236/93 about promotion of new youthful 
enterprises in the services sector, Law 215/95 about positive measures for woman’s 
enterprises, Law 608/96 on special measures for the promotion of autonomous jobs, 
known as ‘prestito d’onore’. In spite of some success stories, they failed in creating an 
entrepreneurial environment because their fragmentation. In addition, incentives to 
investment had a change with the Law 488/92 that received the EU directive of 
transparency, modifying and simplifying the funding measures, regularising the timing 
allocation, and limiting the funding availabilities (Cafiero, 1998).        
 
6.  Conclusions 
Our comparative review of policies of industrial location in Israel and Italy showed 
many similarities, produced by both international economic transformations and the 
presence of undeveloped areas in each country. The study also pointed out on three 
substantial differences. The first is represented by relevance of planning in Israel, and 
his almost complete absence in Italy, especially at national level; the second by the 
weight of the educational system, R&D funding, and spin-off opportunities in Israel; 
and the third by the existence of particular social and economic contexts, facilitating the 
formation of entrepreneurial economies in Italy and the growth of high-technology 
sector in Israel.  
The choice of planning tools has not only depended on goals of political economy that 
Israel have pursued, but on political and social situations and on their effectiveness 
inside the institutional framework. The Israeli ‘population dispersal’ policy, with all its 
ideological background, tried of go up against the pure agglomeration industrial trend,   24
managing to settle industries in the periphery areas and capital intensive in development 
regions, and then, with a reducing of , but only contributing to an evident division 
between labour-intensive industries in metropolitan the government power, favouring 
some local administrations and creating ‘niches of subsidence’ in the fringe of 
metropolitan areas. Only in the ‘90s, the planning has become more sensitive to the 
needs of industrial concentration, offering agglomerative opportunities. In Italy, the 
governmental planning weakness has created a confused set of policies, with a variety 
of industrial situations, a fragmentation of initiatives, a lack of commitments in local 
administrations, a limited degree of public policies’ awareness about the local economic 
and social conditions, but also broad spaces for a spontaneous growth of SMEs and for 
the establishment of autonomous social networks. So, it is possible to consider social-
networks relatively independents and, as a whole, moderately able of strategy, which 
many time finds its reasons in the trans-nationalisation of production and distribution. In 
this context, Israel is well advanced respect Italy in attracting capitals, multinational 
firms and innovative activities. 
Another difference is suggested by the disparity of investment in education and R&D, 
traditionally low in Italy and very high in Israel, with a continuous university and 
research spin-off in industry, constituting an ‘interaction-intensive’ element of an 
innovation system, which created a favourable milieu for high-tech production. In Italy, 
more than a low public investment level in R&D, it has been relevant the almost 
complete absence of private funding and a inadequate presence of universities in 
supporting industrial innovative productions. Notwithstanding a special fund has been 
instituted by Italian government (Law 1089/68, amended by Law 46/82) for sustaining  
research and educational initiative through bottom-up or top-down interventions, the 
situation did not improved in the last years, also for the fragmented and small-scale 
productive structure. Finally, in Italy the industrial district experience was possible in a 
particular environmental context, in specific economic situation, scarcely dependent on 
national or regional policies, rather favoured by weak governments constraints and big 
flexibility.  
Nevertheless, in the eve of  a new-economy triumph both planning systems should be 
more aware of the changes in the spatial organisation of modern manufacturing and 
distribution activities and the communication possibilities, provided by the advent of 
new information technologies, opening a rethinking of public-policy role in local 
economic development issues. The experience has shown the importance of a planning   25
approach, non-ideological, comprehensive, non-fragmentary, and flexible, but the 
ambiguous relationship between national and municipal suggests to define intermediate 
level of planning, sometimes delimited for a specific plan, i.e. an industrial district plan, 
in contexts characterised by mutual trust for easy and faster negotiations, with low 
transaction costs.    26
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